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CA 403 Scoville,  
Herbert

## Iranian Monitor Loss Minimized

CA 402 KH-11  
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Washington—Loss of Iranian monitoring stations is not an insurmountable obstacle to verification of Soviet missile testing under the terms of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty 2, a former deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency said.

"There's no question that we lose intelligence capability with the loss of the stations, but we can still verify because we don't have to see the very-low-altitude telemetry for verification," Herbert Scoville, Jr., said.

His statement was part of a counter-attack by pro-SALT 2 forces against a recent denunciation of the nearly completed treaty by the Coalition for Peace Through Strength (AW&ST Apr. 16, p. 16). Scoville and Townsend Hoopes, former under secretary of the Air Force, presented the views of Americans for SALT.

Scoville said SALT 2 can be verified through such "national technical means" as photographic and electronic satellites and sensors at other ground stations, on ships and on aircraft. "MIRV [multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles], for example, can be verified near reentry or in its higher stages," he noted.

"The loss of the Iranian bases would have many more security implications in the absence of a SALT 2 treaty," Scoville said. "There would be no restrictions on encrypting of telemetry. Does the Coalition really wish to sacrifice the opportunities SALT 2 offers to improve our knowledge of the Soviet threat?"

He was asked about an assertion by Lt. Gen. (ret.) Daniel Graham, former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, that

the compromise last year of the KH-11 reconnaissance satellite gave the Soviets knowledge that makes SALT 2 unverifiable.

"It's incredible that verification would depend on the Soviets not knowing about the KH-11," Scoville responded. "We must assume the Soviets knew we had a satellite for high-resolution photos."

He also addressed Coalition concerns about the Soviet Backfire bomber.

"Actually," Scoville said, "the Soviets have agreed to keep the Backfire production to current levels (not more than 30 per year), and if any planes acquire a capability to launch long-range cruise missiles they will come under ceilings."

Finally, in answering Coalition worries that SALT 2 could weaken the U.S. nuclear shield that protects our North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies, Hoopes said the treaty would not change our reinforcement of NATO conventional forces by tactical nuclear weapons and the coupling of NATO defenses with U.S. strategic forces.

He added that at the recent Guadalupe meeting, the leaders of France, Great Britain and West Germany all informed President Carter of their support for SALT 2.

Hoopes said Soviet planners do not believe, as do some American strategists, in the possibility of discrete, limited tactical nuclear warfare, particularly in Europe. Accordingly, the Soviets must surely assume that nuclear weapons would be used early on in the defense of NATO, and that there would be no way to be certain that their use would not quickly spread beyond the immediate battlefield.